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Non-technical summary
In this working paper we analyse bank screening with regard to the use of hard and soft information. We are interested in differences in the effect of an external credit rating on the use of bank finance, the share of bank to total finance and bank difficulties between newly founded firms in High-Tech vs. Low-Tech industries. We analyse the effect of different rating classes, as well as the availability of a rating. Further we examine whether the effect of bank characteristics differ between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms. In particular, we look at the effects of bank size as a proxy for the bank's hierarchal structure and the bank's expertise and specialization in the firms industry.
We employ the KfW/ZEW start-up panel dataset covering 9,715 firms established in the Our results also suggest that banks rely less on external rating information in their decision making for High-Tech firms. The availability of a credit rating hampers access to bank finance only when the rating is bad. Firms without rating or with a fair or good rating have similar access to bank finance suggesting that banks only employ negative signals from credit ratings in their decision making. We find an interesting difference between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms as our results seem to indicate that a bad rating is less harmful in terms of bank finance for firms in the High-Tech sector than in the Low-Tech sector.
The size of a firm's main bank also determines whether start-ups face difficulties in obtaining bank finance. Our results suggest that firms that have their main relation with a larger bank use less bank finance and report more difficulties in getting credit. By contrast, a larger expertise of the bank in the firm's industry is not associated with fewer difficulties to get bank loans. Bank expertise affects the bank share but there is no evidence on difficulties.
II
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
In diesem Arbeitspapier untersuchen wir die Verwendung von harten und weichen Auch der Anteil der Bankfinanzierung wird lediglich bei Lowtech Unternehmen negativ durch die erstmalige Verfügbarkeit eines negativen Ratings beeinflusst. Schwierigkeiten mit einer Bankfinanzierung nehmen mit der Größe der Hausbank zu. Die Schwierigkeiten nehmen dabei nicht durch eine Expertise der Bank in der Industrie des Unternehmens ab.
Allerdings zeigt sich, dass Unternehmen deren Hausbank eine hohe Expertise haben einen höheren Anteil an Bankfinanzierung nutzen.
Introduction
Newly created firms and in particular high-tech start-ups are the engines of growth in many countries. However, start-up firms -low-tech and high-tech -often face difficulties in raising the required funds to implement their ideas. Banks are argued to be less willing to provide funds to start-ups as these firms lack collateral and are more opaque (see however Robb and Robinson (2012) showing that banks are more important in financing start-ups than previously thought). Asymmetric information regarding creditworthiness and a lack of tangible capital may arguably lead to stronger credit constraints for high-tech start-ups as opposed to low-tech start-ups.
Banks apply a variety of techniques to overcome information asymmetries between themselves and their borrowers. First, they engage in relationship banking, producing information on their clients through (multiple) interaction with them (Boot 2000) . Second, they acquire and process external information on borrowers provided by credit bureaus (Jappelli and Pagano, 2006) . 1 Third, they mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard through contract design, i.e. by differentiating the maturity, size or collateral conditions of loans.
2
We employ a novel dataset -the German KfW/ZEW start-up panel -to study three questions. First, we examine whether high-tech start-ups face more difficulties in accessing bank credit than low-tech start-ups. Second, we examine how banks' use of "hard" credit bureau information to screen new borrowers affects lending to start-ups, and whether the role of credit bureau information in the screening process differs between low-tech and high-tech start-ups. Third, we examine how lending to start-up firms is related to the use of "soft" information within the bank and internal expertise of the bank. Again we examine whether the role of bank-internal information and expertise differs for high-tech start-ups as opposed to low-tech start-ups.
The KfW/ZEW start-up panel provides us with a rich picture of the financing decisions and financing problems of start-ups during their first years of existence. The panel provides us with a nationally representative sample of start-ups stemming from a bank-based 1 Examples of information sharing institutions in Germany are Schufa (credit bureau focussed on bank-borrower and utility-client payments) and Creditreform (credit reference agency focussed on firm-firm payment behavior). 2 Adverse selection can be overcome by offering a range of self-selecting loan contracts to borrowers, which may differ e.g. in collateral requirements (Bester 1985) , size (Freixas and Laffont 1990) , or maturity (Flannery 1986 ). Moral hazard due to non-observable actions of borrowers or costly state-verification can also be mitigated through collateral requirements (Bester 1985) , or repeated short-term lending (Bolton and Sharfstein 1990 bank use more bank finance and report less difficulties in getting credit. This finding suggests that banks which rely more on "soft information" generated through relationship banking are more likely to lend to start-ups. By contrast, a larger expertise of the bank in the firm's industry is not associated with fewer difficulties to get bank loans. We find no differences, in the impact of bank size on high-tech as opposed to low-tech start-ups.
Our results have important policy implications. Recent bank capital regulations introduce a more prominent role for external credit ratings about firms. Policy makers might be concerned that financiers of innovative firms start to rely too much on credit ratings provided by credit bureaus. We find that this concern is unwarranted as banks seem to rely less on external ratings in their loan decision making for high-tech firms than for low-tech firms. In particular, a bad rating obtained by a high-tech firm is less harmful for its bank funding than a negative rating for a low-tech firm. The bigger reliance on credit bureaus therefore does not seem to require any specific policy intervention regarding high-tech firms.
Our results do further suggest that the trend towards more concentration in the banking sector may have detrimental impacts on credit availability for start-up firms. We find that start-ups which use larger banks indeed face more difficulties in obtaining bank finance. However, this result applies for all types of start-ups -low-tech and high-tech -suggesting that policy intervention for innovative firms is unwarranted.
Our paper contributes to three current strands of literature in the field of entrepreneurship and financial intermediation: (i) the financing of start-ups, (ii) the impact of credit information sharing on credit assessment and credit availability, and (iii) the relation between bank organization and lending technology.
Young and innovative firms differ in several dimensions from established firms, and are especially prone to financial constraints. In addition to a high degree of uncertainty associated with the output of innovative investment, the entrepreneur or inventor is better informed than investors about the nature of the project and the likelihood of success (Hall 2009 ). This implies that the lender-firm relationship is more exposed to adverse selection and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) for start-ups with innovative investments than for those with traditional investment or established firms. Firms can mitigate financing problems by offering collateral (Bester 1985, Harhoff and Körting 1998) or building up reputation developed through repeated interactions (Boot 2000) . Innovative firms may have difficulties providing collateral since most R&D expenditures consists of worker wages and salaries and the assets created are intangible and idiosyncratic and therefore have a low salvage value (Hall 2009 ). Lerner (1995) and Gompers and Lerner (1996) stress that, compared to venture capitalists, banks face more difficulties in monitoring firms with few tangible assets. Recent evidence on start-ups financial structure shows that banks are the main supplier of external funds to small and young businesses both in Europe and in the US. In the specific case of high tech firms, outside equity such as venture capital, plays in general a more important role than debt (Bozkaya and Pottelsberghe 2008) . Due to lack of data, one key aspect missing in the recent empirical literature is the relation between start-ups credit availability and the characteristics of banks. We find that start-ups financed by larger banks face more financial difficulties whereas start-ups dealing with banks with a greater expertise in an industry do not seem to relax credit constraints.
Second, our paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on the role of information sharing for the functioning of credit markets. Theory suggests that sharing of information among creditors can reduce adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli 1993) and entrepreneurial moral hazard (Padilla and Pagano 1997) in bank-borrower relationships.
Several recent empirical studies employing micro datasets, cross-country datasets, and experiments have demonstrated that credit information sharing is beneficial to credit market performance. Credit scoring models based on credit agency data suggests that the use of credit reports allows lenders to more accurately predict loan defaults (Kallberg and Udell, 2003 Stein (2002) argues that in large, hierarchical banks the incentives of a loan officer to acquire "soft" information about his clients are muted, as this information cannot be verifiably documented to the officer's superiors who approve loan applications. As a consequence large hierarchical banks will be less likely to invest in screening and monitoring, and thus to lend to financially opaque firms. Empirical work has employed different strategies to identify the impact of bank organization on the employed lending technology. Berger et al. (2005a Berger et al. ( , 2005b for example start from the presumption that large banks are more hierarchical. They show that smaller SMEs borrow from smaller banks and that while smaller banks do increasingly use credit scoring methods, they still have stronger relationships with their borrowers. Others have more direct proxies for hierarchy by employing the number of decision layers within a bank. 4 Liberti and Mian (2009) find that greater hierarchical distance between the information collecting agent and the hierarchical unit that decides on loans leads to less reliance on 3 Recent experimental results indicate that information sharing disciplines borrowers to repay their loans (Brown and Zehnder, 2007) . Cross-country evidence, supports the conjecture that information sharing improves credit availability at the aggregate level (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2007) and the firm level (Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2009 ). 4 Liberti (2005) , for example, studies how changes in a bank's organizational structure affect the incentives of account managers to collect soft information and to employ it in the pricing of loans. He finds that account managers who receive more authority are more inclined to collect and use soft information.
subjective information and more on objective information. Degryse, Laeven and Ongena (2009) find that more hierarchical banks specialize more in transparent firms and employ a more uniform loan pricing strategy. We contribute to this literature by investigating how bank size and expertise impacts on credit constraints of start-up firms and whether this impact varies for high-tech as opposed to low-tech firms. Our results suggest that start-up firms-both low-tech and high-tech face less credit constraints when their main bank is small. We do not find such an effect for bank expertise.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and our methodology. Section 3 describes the results of our empirical analysis using the KfW/ZEW start-up panel. Section 4 concludes.
Data & Methodology
Our analysis is based on the three initial waves (2008, 2009 and 2010) of the KfW/ZEW Start-up panel. This survey contains information on the financing, economic activity and ownership of start-up firms in Germany 5 . The survey includes subsequent waves allowing to investigate the development of newly founded firms over time.
Panel Structure
The sample consists of 9,715 firms among which 4,972 are observed once, 2,902 are observed twice and 2,309 are observed in all three waves (see Table 1 , panel A). This yields a total of 15,000 firm-year observations (see Table 1 implies that with our three waves of data, our dataset includes firms ageing one to five years.
Financing information is only provided for the year of observation. Therefore, financing information in the firm's initial year is not given for those with delayed entry into the Start-up Panel.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 39% of all observations are for High-Tech firms. We distinguish between High-Tech firms and Low-Tech firms defined according to average 5 The survey oversamples start-ups in High-Tech industries and firms which receive subsidized funding from the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). KFW is a business development bank at the federal level in Germany which is government owned and was initiated to promote Germany at home as well as abroad. In addition to the provision of subsidized loans the KfW also manages subsidies assigned by the federal employment agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). For robustness checks all regressions are estimated without firms stratified based on their KfW characteristic. 6 We choose to classify firm innovativeness according to industry-level R&D activity rather than firm-level in order to mitigate issues of endogeneity of R&D to bank finance. However, using information on firm-level R&D from the ZEW/KfW Start-up Panel to classify firms as innovative (have at least one full-time employee engaged in R&D) versus non-innovative (no full-time employee engaged in R&D) yields similar patterns of bank finance as presented in Panel C of Table 2 .
Bank Finance
We employ three dependent variables, each capturing different aspects of firm financing using banks. Bank use is a dummy which is 1 for all firms that use bank finance for working capital or new investment in a particular year. Bank share is the share of working capital and new investment financed by banks in a particular year. The other sources of external financing are start-up grants for previous unemployed entrepreneurs by the federal employment agency, loans provided by family members or friends, mezzanine capital, and external equity 7 . Both Bank use and Bank share are measures of the usage of bank finance.
Finally, Bank difficulties is a dummy variable which equals one when a firm states that it had difficulties in getting bank finance for working capital or new investment in a given year. We interpret this variable as an inverse measure of credit availability. Table 2 presents summary statistics for our three dependent variables. Panel A suggests that in 26 percent of the firmyears, firms use bank finance with an average share of bank finance to total finance of 9 percent. Also, firms report difficulties in accessing bank finance in around 15% of the firmyears.
Panel B of Table 2 reports sample means for our dependent variables by firm age.
Interestingly, the share of firms which use bank finance declines over time from 35 percent in the first year to 24 percent in the 5 th year. This decline may be driven by lower needs for new investment and the ability to finance working capital with retained earnings after the initial start-up phase. However, it may also be driven by attrition. Firms which require external finance may be less likely to survive the initial start-up phase and thus disappear from the survey. To control for demand and attrition effects, the right hand side of Panel B reports the means of our three dependent variables only for the subsample of firms which Require external finance. We define these firms as those which either use external finance (bank finance or other sources of external financing) and/or firms which report difficulties in accessing external finance. The data presented in Panel B suggests that once we control for attrition and the demand for external finance, the use of bank finance hardly changes over time. In their first year of existence, 66 percent of firms that require external finance use bank finance, while among the five-year-old firms 68 percent do so. The share of bank finance to total finance also remains fairly stable over time for firms that demand external finance, while the share of firms reporting difficulties in accessing bank finance increases with firm age. Panel B also reports the use of other sources of external finance by firm age. We learn that the federal employment agency is most important in the first year and considerably drops thereafter. The other sources remain fairly stable in firm age. In Panel C of 
External credit rating
We match the data from the ZEW/KfW Start-up Panel with information provided by the credit bureau Creditreform to yield external credit rating information for each firm.
Creditreform is the biggest database on German companies with more than 3.6 million entries. It is the leading source of information on creditworthiness of small firms. While
Germany has also a public credit registry organized by the Bundesbank, it contains only information on large exposures (more than €1.5 million), a threshold largely exceeding the loans to start-up firms. From the Creditreform database we extract for each firm and each year an indicator of whether an external credit rating is provided for the firm, and if so, how the firm is rated. Similar to the credit scores provided e.g. by Dun & Bradstreet, the score provided by Creditreform is based on past payment behavior on trade credit from suppliers as well as utilities. The information on payment behavior is enhanced with a subjective assessment by Creditreform of the firm's future capability to honor credit relations. The latter assessment is provided by the analyst investigating the firm. It is based on the full set of information regarding the firm including e.g. order situation. As illustrated in Table 3 , Panel A, each firm is rated on a scale of 1 to 6. In line with the classification by Creditreform we code the rating classes 1 (advise against a business relation), 2 (Business relation is a matter of trust) and 3 (Business relation at discretion) as Bad rating. Rating class 4 (Business relation approvable) is coded as Fair rating, while classes 5 (Business relation approved) and 6 (Business relation supported) are coded as Good rating. Table 3 , Panel B reports the frequency by firm age of the availability of a credit rating and the rating type -no rating, bad, fair and good. As past payment behavior on trade credit and utilities is a key element of the credit rating, it is not surprising that only a minority of firms (1.7 percent) are rated in their first year of existence. The data suggests that the assignment of a credit rating in the first year of existence is endogenous to firm payment behavior: Ratings assigned in the first year of existence are much more likely to be bad ratings (17.6%) than ratings assigned later. The share of rated firms increases fast between the age of two and four years, so that among four year old firms only 9% have no rating. 
Size and expertise of main bank
The Creditreform database also provides information on the main bank relation of each firm. Creditreform gathers information on bank-firm relationships from firm letterheads, invoices and financial statements. We classify each firm's main bank according to the size of that bank and how focused the lending of that bank is in the firm's industry. As our dataset does not provide us with information on the total loan portfolio of each bank we approximate
Bank size by the total labor force employed by all firms the bank serves as a main bank. We For each firm we not only have information on the main bank but also the corresponding bank branch is identified. We therefore are in a position to measure Bank size, Bank expertise
and Bank specialization at the national, state or regional level. Motivated by the conjecture that in large, nationwide German banks credit decisions are made at either branch, regional or state level, but hardly at the national level, we calculate all three indicators at the state level.
9 Table 4 , Panel A, provides definitions and summary statistics for all our key explanatory variables.
Control variables
In our multivariate analysis we control for a range of firm characteristics which may affect a firm's access to bank finance. [3]
, ,
Results
Tables 5-8 present the results of our multivariate analysis. In tables (5-7) we report results for all firms as well as for the subsample of firms that seek external finance, while in table 8 we report results only for the subsample of firms that seek external finance. By excluding those firms that do not require external financing for investment or operations we try to disentangle supply side effects from demand side drivers of the use of bank finance.
However, because there are other sources of external finance, results reported for bank finance (i.e., Bank use and Bank share) may also be driven by demand. Therefore, we only conclude that there is a credit availability effect when we find significant results in the regression for Bank difficulties. Table 2 shows that among the firms that seek external finance, 65%
Firm innovation and bank finance
use bank finance, the average bank share of external financing is 22% and the share of firms that report difficulties getting bank finance is 38%. Compared to these sample averages the estimated differences between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms are not only statistically, but also economically significant. However, the availability of such outside collateral does not seem to diminish the likelihood of facing difficulties in getting bank finance. Considering the estimates in columns (1-3) Manufacturing firms seem to use more bank finance than service firms, but are also likely to experience difficulties in getting bank finance. However, these results seem to be driven by differences in credit demand across industries: Considering only those firms that seek external finance the estimates in columns (4-6) suggest similar access to bank credit for Manufacturing and service orientated firms.
Credit rating and bank finance Table 6 presents our estimations of Equation (1) in which we examine the relation between the external credit rating of firms and their use and access to bank finance. We run three specifications, one for each of our three dependent variables. We do this again for the full sample of firms (columns 1-3) as well as for the firms seeking external finance (columns 4-6). We report OLS estimates for all coefficients, with clustered standard errors in parentheses.
In The results presented in Table 6 suggest that Low-Tech firms which have a Bad rating are less likely to use bank finance, and are more likely to experience difficulties in getting bank finance than firms with either a Good rating, Fair rating, or No rating (the omitted category).
The effect is economically important as shown in columns 4-6 for the subsample of firms which seek external finance. A Low-Tech firm with a bad rating is 25.7 percentage points less likely to use bank finance and 31 percentage points more likely to face bank difficulties than a Low-Tech firm with no rating. Tests for equality of the coefficients No rating, Fair
Rating and Good rating also suggest that in the Low-Tech industry there is no difference in access to finance between firms which have no, fair or good ratings. Similar tests show that the same pattern holds for High-Tech firms. Thus among the start-up firms in our sample it appears that firms without a credit rating are treated as if they have a good or fair rating. This behavior by banks seems very reasonable given that at most 5% of the firms actually do get a bad credit rating, when they are rated (Table 3 , Panel B). Table 6 . Credit rating and bank finance: Cross-sectional estimates
All models include a fulls set of firm-level control variables and year dummies. All standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. See Tables 2 and 4 for definitions of all variables. Contrary to our predictions, none of the interaction terms between High-Tech and the rating variables is significant, suggesting that the impact of the same credit rating on firm access to bank finance does not differ between High-Tech and Low-Tech firms.
Firms
The specifications in Table 6 do not take advantage of the panel structure of our data that can allow us to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. So in Table 7 we perform differences-of-means tests of the changes in Bank share after obtaining a credit rating between Low-Tech and High-Tech firms. We do this for the three credit rating possibilities:
when rated for the first time the firm can receive a bad rating, fair rating or good rating. We focus on those firms that received their first credit rating at the age of two, three or four years.
As shown in Table 3 , over 95 percent of firms receive their first rating during these years. We exclude firms which receive their initial rating already in their first year of existence as well as those that are not rated until their fifth year in order to mitigate selection effects. Table 7 shows that, when considering all firms (whether seeking external finance or not), a bad rating decreases Bank share by 8% in the case of Low-Tech firms, while the effect for High-Tech firms is close to zero. Importantly, the difference between the two groups is statistically significant. When restricting the sample to those firms that seek external finance, the magnitudes and signs of the effects are similar though now the difference is not significant, probably due to the lower number of observations and thus less statistical power.
These results seem to indicate that a bad rating is less harmful in terms of bank finance for firms in the High-Tech sector than in the Low-Tech sector. Banks seem to rely less on external rating information in their decision making for High-Tech firms. 
(1)- (2) (2)- (3) (1)-(3) (4) (5) (6) (4)- (5) (5)- (6) (4)- (6) Low-Tech ∆ (3) High-tech may face more difficulties in getting bank credit as opposed to Low-tech firms when they bank with a large bank. However, this result is not confirmed in column (6).
Robustness tests
In the data section we mentioned that the ZEW/KfW panel oversamples start-ups that were stratified based on their KfW characteristics (see Fryges, Gottschalk, and Kohn (2010) for details). The KfW supports firms with promotional financial means like loans, equity and mezzanine capital, or grants. Because banks could behave differently when faced with firms that receive those subsidies, we check the robustness of our results by running all regressions in Table 5 , 6, 7 and 8 excluding the KfW firms. All our results survive after dropping those observations with the exception of the one that pointed to High-Tech firms being more likely to have bank difficulties than Low-Tech firms (see Table 5 ). This effect disappears when we limit our sample to firms not supported by KfW, while High-Tech firms are still significantly different from Low-Tech firms in terms of use of bank finance. These findings suggest that among firms not supported by KfW although High-Tech firms use less bank finance than Low-Tech firms, this difference may be mostly demand-driven.
Conclusions
This paper employs a unique dataset on German start-ups to study how banks screen start-ups in low-tech and high-tech sectors. We study whether the availability of external information -such as a credit rating granted by a credit bureau -impacts bank-credit availability and whether such a credit rating has differential impacts for High-Tech firms versus Low-Tech firms. Furthermore we investigate how the size of the firm's main bank influences a start-up's credit availability and whether a bank's focus and expertise has a differential role for low-tech and high-tech firms. These are important questions as start-ups are an important engine of economic growth and High-Tech firms may not have the necessary sources available to realize an economy's potential.
We find that high-tech start-up firms are less likely to use bank finance and face more difficulties in raising bank finance than Low-Tech firms. This suggests that firms from industries that exhibit a greater research and development intensity employ less bank finance.
Our results also suggest that banks rely less on external rating information in their decision making for High-Tech firms. The availability of a credit rating hampers access to bank finance only when the rating is bad. Firms without rating or with a fair or good rating have similar access to bank finance suggesting that banks only employ negative signals from credit ratings in their decision making. We find an interesting difference between high-tech and low-tech firms as our results seem to indicate that a bad rating is less harmful in terms of bank finance for firms in the High-Tech sector than in the Low-Tech sector.
The size of a firm's main bank also determines whether start-ups face difficulties in obtaining bank finance. Our results suggest that firms that have their main relation with a larger bank use less bank finance and report more difficulties in getting credit. By contrast, a larger expertise of the bank in the firm's industry is not associated with fewer difficulties to get bank loans. We find no robust evidence that the impact of bank size is more pronounced for High-tech firms as opposed to Low-tech firms.
Our results have important policy implications. Policy makers might be concerned that financiers of innovative firms rely too much on credit ratings provided by credit bureaus.
We find that this concern is unwarranted as banks seem to rely less on external ratings in their loan decision making for high-tech firms than for low-tech firms. Also, the trend towards more concentration in the banking sector may have detrimental impacts on credit availability for firms where loans are based upon soft information. We find that start-ups employing larger banks indeed face more difficulties in obtaining bank finance. However, this result applies for all types of start-ups -low-tech and high-tech -suggesting that a differential policy intervention for innovative firms is unwarranted. 
